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IV, JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction under Rules 3, 4 and 42, Utah R. 
App.P., and Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3) (j) and -2(4), and 78-2a-
3(2) (k) . 
V. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
A. Did plaintiffs waive a right to complain that the 
jury did not award general damages, by failing (1) to request an 
instruction mandating such an award, (2) to object to the 
instructions given, or (3) to object after the jury had awarded 
no general damages? 
B. Assuming no waiver: 
1. Must the jury award general if i t awards 
specia l damages? 
2. Did the evidence support the j u r y ' s verdic t 
on general damages? 
C, Did the evidence support the j u r y ' s d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
fau l t? 1 
D, Was Robinette properly on the verdic t form? 
1 Gunther ' s addresses t h i s i s s u e except as t o the claim t h a t a v e r d i c t of 
no f a u l t as aga ins t Lennox was aga ins t the weight of the evidence, which Lennox 
add re s se s . 
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E. Was the court within its discretion to exclude Ramona 
Hopkins' testimony? 
F. Was the court within its discretion to limit 
plaintiffs' rebuttal case? 
G. Was the court within its discretion to admit 
quantitative MRI data? 
H. Was plaintiffs' punitive damages claim properly kept 
from the jury? 
VI. GOVERNING LAW 
Common law; Rule 51, Utah R.Civ.P. 
VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW. 
Plaintiffs sued Gunther's for claimed injuries from exposure 
to carbon monoxide ("CO"), which resulted from Gunther's retrofit 
of a gas for an oil furnace in plaintiffs' home. They added 
negligence claims against their landlords and the City inspector. 
They sued the furnace manufacturer separately, and the cases 
were consolidated. Plaintiffs settled with the landlords before 
trial. 
The trial lasted most of November 1994. The court dismissed 
the punitive damages claim against Gunther's at the close of 
-2-
plaintiffs' case. The jury found at fault defendants Gunther's 
35%, Robinette 35%, Viehwigs 10% and Lennox 0%# and plaintiff 
Cameron 20%. The jury awarded special damages totaling $17,700, 
for medical expenses for plaintiffs' temporary, CO-induced flu-
like symptoms, and no general damages. The jury concluded plain-
tiffs had suffered no permanent injury and no substantial pain 
and suffering. The court denied plaintiffs' post-trial motions. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS.2 
1. DAMAGES ISSUES. 
a. PLAINTIFFS' WAIVERS. 
The jury returned without having completed the verdict form. 
It had included amounts for special damages but left blank the 
lines for general and total damages. Plaintiffs asked the court 
to direct the jury to award general damages since it appeared it 
might award special damages. The judge instead told the jury to 
"complete the form as to damages . . . . General damages may be 
completed in such sums, if any, you feel is appropriate. As to 
what constitutes general damages, I would again refer you to 
Instruction No. 47." Vol. 15, 2-11. 
2Gunther's sets forth the facts in order of the issues and arguments raised 
in appellants' Brief. Because plaintiffs failed to marshal the evidence, 
Gunther's does so in support of the portions of the verdict appellants challenge 
on a claim of insufficiency of evidence. 
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Instruction 47 provided: 
[It] will be your duty to determine the amount of 
Plaintiffs' damages, if any, as you may find from a 
preponderance of the evidence will reasonably and 
adequately compensate Plaintiffs for any injury and 
loss Plaintiffs may have sustained as a result of the 
incident and injuries complained of by Plaintiffs. 
In determining such damages, you may consider the 
nature and extent of the injuries sustained by the 
Plaintiffs, the degree and character of Plaintiffs' 
suffering, both mental and physical, its probable 
duration and severity, and the extent to which 
Plaintiffs had been prevented from pursuing the 
ordinary affairs of life theretofore enjoyed. You may 
also consider lost wages as well as lost future wages. 
If you find the plaintiff has suffered a loss of 
earning capacity, you should award the present cash 
value of earning capacity reasonably likely to be lost 
in the future as a result of the injury in question. 
Pain and mental and physical suffering have no market 
value. They are not capable of being exactly or accu-
rately determined, and there is no fixed rule or 
standard whereby damages for them can be measured. You 
may however make such award for pain and mental and 
physical suffering as will provide reasonable compensa-
tion for such injuries and suffering. 
You may also consider whether any of the above will, 
with reasonable certainty, continue in the future. 
You are not permitted to award Plaintiffs speculative 
damages by which term is meant compensation for detri-
ment which, although possible, is remote, conjectural 
or speculative. 
R. 2227-26 (emphasis supplied). 
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Instruction 47 was virtually identical to plaintiffs' 
proffered damages instructions. R. 2008.3 P l a i n t i f f s d i d n o t 
o b j e c t t o I n s t r u c t i o n 47 o r e x c e p t t o t h e c o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o g i v e 
p l a i n t i f f s ' p r o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n . Nor d i d p l a i n t i f f p r o f f e r an 
i n s t r u c t i o n t h a t d i r e c t e d t h e j u r y t o award some amount i n 
g e n e r a l damages i f t h e j u r y awarded s p e c i a l damages . V o l . 1 3 , 
1 0 7 - 1 2 ; R. 1 9 9 5 - 2 0 3 5 , 2 0 5 3 - 6 4 . The j u r y d e l i b e r a t e d f u r t h e r , p u t 
"0 f fs on t h e l i n e s f o r g e n e r a l s and t o t a l e d t h e damages . 
P l a i n t i f f s d i d n o t o b j e c t t o t h e v e r d i c t a s i r r e g u l a r o r 
i n s u f f i c i e n t . The j u r y was d i s m i s s e d . V o l . 1 5 , 1 2 - 1 8 . 
b . FACTS SUPPORTING NO GENERAL DAMAGES. 
P l a i n t i f f s were e x p o s e d t o CO a t d i f f e r i n g d e g r e e s o v e r 
d i f f e r e n t p e r i o d s of t i m e . None l o s t c o n s c i o u s n e s s . They 
e x p e r i e n c e d f l u - l i k e symptoms, d r o v e t o t h e h o s p i t a l and were 
t r e a t e d . The a c u t e symptoms r e s o l v e d s h o r t l y a f t e r p l a i n t i f f s 
had l e f t t h e CO e n v i r o n m e n t . 
3 P l a i n t i f f s a l so sought t h i s ins truct ion: 
If you find the i s sues in favor of the P l a i n t i f f s and against the 
Defendant[s] , then i t i s your duty to award the P l a i n t i f f s such damages, 
i f any, that you f ind, from a preponderance of the evidence, w i l l f a i r l y 
and adequately compensate P l a i n t i f f s for the injury and damage sustained. 
(This instruct ion, page 27 of P l a i n t i f f s ' Proposed Jury Instruct ions, was omitted 
from the Record and should be included between R. 2008 and 2009.) 
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The principal general damages question was whether 
plaintiffs had suffered anything more than temporary flu-like 
symptoms. Plaintiffs claimed they had suffered permanent brain, 
heart and lung damage and that their pain and suffering had 
lasted longer and in a greater degree than one might experience 
with flu. Evidence they had not was overwhelming. The jury 
concluded plaintiffs had failed to prove the existence of 
substantial pain and suffering, even though they were entitled to 
payment of medical expenses. 
Dr. Richard D. Stewart, a nationally renown doctor of 
internal medicine, testified concerning his research on the 
short- and long-term effects of CO exposure, which utilized a 
sophisticated environmental chamber, and in which he and many of 
his colleagues and students volunteered as subjects to high 
levels of exposure. He had published 2 0-40 articles about CO and 
its effects. Vol. 9, 78-104, 110, and Exhibit 79. His opinions 
were: 
--he was unaware of anyone involved in his CO studies who 
had suffered any long-term effects. Vol. 9, 104. 
--Kenyon Cotton experienced an acute exposure to CO which, 
at the level measured, would have caused headache, possible 
-6-
visual disturbance, nausea, and possible vomiting. By the next 
day, all symptoms would have been gone with no long-term 
sequelae. Vol. 9, 128-130. 
--Tina Cotton experienced an acute exposure to CO which, at 
the level measured, would have caused headache, nausea, probable 
vomiting, visual disturbance and achy muscles. Within 24 hours 
of removal of the excessive CO from her system (half-life was 
five to six hours without oxygen supplement and about one and 
one-half hours with), all acute systems would have been gone 
permanently, with no long-term sequelae. There was nothing in 
the medical literature to suggest a connection between CO 
exposure without loss of consciousness and pulmonary emboli. 
Tina Cotton had not been diagnosed with restrictive 
cardiomyopathy, but in any event, nowhere did the medical 
literature suggest that CO was causally connected to restrictive 
cardiomyopathy. Vol. 9, 131-34. 
--Marie Cameron experienced an acute exposure to CO which, 
at the level measured, would have caused similar symptomology to 
what Tina experienced, but with greater intensity. There is no 
evidence that she sustained permanent heart injury from the 
exposure. She had pre-existing angina and underlying coronary 
-7-
heart disease. There was no evidence of a causal connection 
between the CO exposure and her later need for an angioplasty. 
There was no evidence of permanent injury due to the CO exposure, 
but there was a host of pre-existing complaints, starting with 
white matter disease--possibly MS--which caused functional 
overlay of anxiety depression syndromes, atypical migraines, 
confusion and memory problems. Vol. 9, 134-39. 
Dr. Erin David Bigler testified concerning his extensive 
education, research, clinical experience, publications, teaching 
certifications and associations in the area of neuropsychology 
and neuroimaging. He had consulted extensively with patients who 
had CO exposure. Vol. 9, 197-209 and Exhibit 80. His opinions 
were: 
--Kenyon Cotton had a normal MRI scan, including the regions 
of the brain believed susceptible to anoxic injury. Vol. 10, 15-
25, 171-72, 174-77. 
--His full-scale IQ, post-CO exposure, fell in the above-
average range. Kenyon predictably would have scored in the 
normal range absent CO exposure, and he scored in the normal 
range on other neuropsychological tests and exceptionally well on 
-8-
others, which had to do with myriad complex brain functions. 
Vol. 10, 25-59, 184-86. 
--Kenyon's testing indicated no problems with memory, 
learning or attention concentration. Vol. 10, 59-60. 
--Kenyon may have Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, which 
predated and was unrelated to the exposure. Vol. 10, 63-64. 
--Marie's hippocampus was unchanged from before to after 
exposure, based on pre- and post-MRIs. Other than the 
preexisting white matter disease, her post exposure scan showed 
no problems and was within normal limits. The white matter 
disease affected the functioning of the brain by blocking primary 
pathways and preventing proper connection. The white matter 
lesions would have affected complex reasoning, problem solving, 
judgment, aspects of memory, attentional and emotional 
regulation, perceptual functioning, language, visual/spacial and 
the like. Such problems were documented in medical records which 
predated the exposure. Vol. 10, 66-79, 179-81, 186-88. 
--the neuropsychological results were consistent with 
Marie's preexisting problems. Vol. 10, 79-90. 
--Tina Cotton's MRI scan showed nothing abnormal. Her 
neuropsychological tests showed she would have performed at the 
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average to low average range prior to exposure, which was normal. 
Her post-exposure testing was consistent with where she would 
have tested without exposure. One result suggested malingering. 
Because of differences in results of tests taken post exposure, 
factors such as functional overlay were likely, which could have 
included stress, depression, anxiety and the like. Vol. 10, 90-
100. 
--in Dr. Bigler's experience, full recovery occurred in all 
cases involving people who had not become comatose from exposure. 
Vol, 10, 103. 
--Tina Cotton and Marie Cameron experienced no brain damage 
from the exposure. Vol. 10, 104. 
Dr. Kevin Tracy McCusker, an internist specializing in 
pulmonary disease, Vol. 10, 206-08 and Exhibit 96, testified 
that: 
--Tina Cotton had a very mild form of asthma, there was 
nothing in the medical literature to tie it to the exposure, and 
the exposure was unrelated to her asthma. Vol. 10, 210-11. 
--the medical literature did not connect CO exposure to 
pulmonary emboli, and there were other causative factors, such as 
inactivity due in part to obesity. Tina Cotton's exposure had 
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nothing to do with her pulmonary emboli, which was treated and 
resolved without incident. Vol. 10, 211-15. 
Dr. Stephen R. Thorn, a board certified M.D., Ph.D, and 
researcher on the pathophysiology of CO, was on faculty at 
medical schools, and had a large practice which involved seeing 
patients who had been exposed to CO. Vol. 11, 3-7, and Exhibit 
97. His opinions were: 
--the accepted medical view concerning patients who do not 
become comatose from exposure is they suffer no permanent damage. 
Vol. 11, 7. 
--many patients who become comatose from exposure recover 
completely. Vol. 11, 8. 
--one of his studies concluded that people with exposure who 
do not lose consciousness return to normal within a short time, 
with no long-term sequelae. Some older patients take longer to 
normalize. There is no correlation between the duration of CO 
exposure and risk of delayed neurological sequelae. Vol. 11, 8-
28. 
--plaintiffs suffered no brain injury from the CO exposure. 
Vol. 11, 29. 
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--the medical literature does not suggest a connection 
between CO and asthma, pulmonary embuli or restrictive 
cardiomyopathy, and Tina Cotton could not have suffered pulmonary 
emboli from her exposure. Vol. 11, 30-32. 
--Tina Cotton and Marie Cameron suffered no permanent heart 
injury as a result of their CO exposure, and the exposure did not 
contribute to angina after the CO had dissipated. Vol. 11, 30, 
33, 68-69. 
Dr. Neil Shadoff testified concerning his education, 
training, experience, research, board certifications in internal 
medicine and cardiovascular diseases and publications. Vol. 11, 
78-86. His opinions were: 
--Tina Cotton did not suffer from restrictive cardio-
myopathy, and no heart damage as a result of her CO exposure, and 
there was no support in the medical literature to suggest CO 
causes restrictive cardiomyopathy. Vol. 11, 86-94, 122-33, 163. 
--Tina Cotton did not suffer pulmonary emboli from her 
exposure. Vol. 11, 133-35. 
--Marie Cameron suffered no permanent heart damage from her 
exposure and the exposure did not cause ongoing angina in Marie 
Cameron. She had preexisting heart problems which were not 
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aggravated, other than with temporary angina during the exposure, 
as a result of the exposure. Vol. 11, 135-58, 163. 
--there was no reason from a cardiology standpoint that Tina 
Cotton or Marie Cameron could not be employed, or that Tina 
Cotton could not lead a normally active life. Vol. 11, 162. 
2. FACTS SUPPORTING ASSESSMENT OF FAULT. 
a. MULTIPLE PROXIMATE CAUSES: ALLEGATIONS AND 
INSTRUCTIONS. 
The consolidated cases alleged the fault of Gunthers, 
Lennox, Robinette and the Viehwigs combined to cause plaintiffs' 
injuries. R. 166-79.4 The Second Amended Complaint alleged 
breaches of legal duties by all defendants, defendants' 
collective acts and omissions combined to cause injuries and each 
defendant's breach was a proximate cause. R. 169-70. 
Plaintiffs sought a standard instruction relating to 
multiple proximate causes, which the court gave in substance 
without objection. R. 2018, 2256. The court also gave a 
standard instruction concerning superseding cause, without 
objection. R. 2251; Vol. 13, 107-12. 
4See also Case 930400597 PI, R. 1-13, the Complaint in the consolidated 
cases. 
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b. ROBINETTE'S FAULT. 
(1) ALLEGATIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS. 
Plaintiffs alleged: 
Defendant Frank Robinette is an independent contractor 
for the City of Nephi who inspected the Demised 
Premises, the Furnace and Gunther's installation of the 
Furnace before the Furnace was connected to the Nephi 
city [sic] gas line. . . . 
Defendant Robinette had the duty to determine that the 
Furnace was properly installed and the Furnace Room was 
properly ventilated before he approved the Demised 
Premises as being ready for connection to the city gas 
line. . . . 
Robinette negligently failed to analyze whether the 
Furnace Room was vented in accord with industry 
standards and would provide the Furnace with the 
requisite combustion air. The Furnace Room was all but 
air tight when Robinette approved Gunther's installa-
tion and permitted the city gas line to be 
connected. . . . 
R. 173-74; Case 930400597 PI, R. 1-13. 
Plaintiffs' proffered jury instructions provided that 
Mr. Robinette's conduct should not be considered a superseding 
cause of the other defendants' conduct. The Court gave that 
instruction. R. 2271-72. The Court also gave an instruction, 
plaintiff's request, that Robinette's approval of the 
installation did not approve any Gunther's violations. R. 170, 
177; Case 930400597 PI, R. 1-13. 
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Having sued and prayed for damages against Mr. Robinette, 
plaintiffs did not object to his inclusion on the verdict form, 
but during the instruction phase raised a defense on his behalf 
that he should not be held to a negligence standard. Vol. 13, 
110-12. 
(2) EVIDENCE OF INSPECTOR'S FAULT. 
Mr. Robinette was responsible for inspecting the furnace 
installation. Vol. 2, 206-08. His responsibility was not to 
unlock the gas meter and permit the furnace to go into operation 
if it was unsafe. Vol. 2, 240-41. He was negligent for failing 
to determine compliance with the Uniform Mechanical Code and 
insufficiency of combustion air, and permitting the furnace to be 
operated. Vol. 9, 13-14, 36, 63-67. 
There were several oversights. The room in which the 
furnace was located was a "confined space" within the meaning of 
the Code, requiring a minimum of two permanent combustion air 
openings. Vol. 2, 212, 269; Vol. 3, 413-14, 470-71, 544. There 
was only one combustion air opening in the furnace room, which 
did not comply with the Code in terms of number or size, and the 
intake end was latently blocked by wood or concrete during a 
previous remodel. Vol 2, 213-16, 242-43, 249-52, 254-56, 270-73; 
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Vol. 3, 414-17, 456-59, 470-71; Vol. 9, 63-67. There was another 
vent which terminated in the house but was not a combustion air 
vent. Vol. 3, 417-20, 544. And there were gaps around pipes in 
the furnace room and under the door, which did not qualify as 
vents. Vol. 3, 420-21. Despite Robinette's belief that 
sufficient combustion air openings existed, in part because the 
furnace room had accommodated the prior furnace, there was 
insufficient combustion air. Vol. 3, 420-21, 479; Vol. 9, 63-
67. The installation failed to meet current Code. Vol. 3, 453-
54, 461, 480-81, 264-67; Vol. 9. 13, 63-67. 
c . FAULT OF VIEHWIGS. 
(1) ALLEGATIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS. 
P l a i n t i f f s a l l e g e d : 
As l a n d l o r d , D e f e n d a n t s Viehwig owed t h e i r t e n a n t and 
h e r f a m i l y a d u t y t o e x e r c i s e r e a s o n a b l e c a r e i n 
u n d e r t a k i n g t o improve t h e Demised P r e m i s e s g e n e r a l l y 
and , i n p a r t i c u l a r , by r e p l a c i n g t h e o i l f u r n a c e 
p r e v i o u s l y u s e d i n t h e Demised P r e m i s e s w i t h a new g a s 
f u r n a c e , and b r e a c h e d t h a t d u t y t h r o u g h t h e a c t i o n s of 
G u n t h e r ' s , and by f a i l i n g t o p r o p e r l y i n s t a l l and 
i n s p e c t t h e F u r n a c e . 
R. 1 7 3 ; Case 930400597 P I , R. 1 - 1 3 . 5 
Consis tent with t h i s a l l ega t ion , the court gave the following instruct ion 
t o which p l a i n t i f f s did object : 
A landlord has a duty to exerc i se reasonable care to see that the leased 
premises are reasonably safe and su i tab le for intended uses . A landlord 
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(2) EVIDENCE OF LANDLORDS' FAULT. 
The l a n d l o r d s were n e g l i g e n t f o r f a i l i n g t o a l e r t G u n t h e r ' s 
o r t h e i n s p e c t o r t h a t t h e o i l b u r n i n g f u r n a c e had smoked and made 
r e s i d e n t s i l l . T h i s would have a l e r t e d G u n t h e r ' s and t h e 
i n s p e c t o r t o c o m b u s t i o n a i r p r o b l e m s . V o l . 2 , 1 9 3 - 9 4 , 2 4 3 - 4 4 , 
2 4 7 - 4 8 ; V o l . 8, 2 4 2 - 4 4 . 
The l a n d l o r d s were n e g l i g e n t f o r f a i l i n g t o a l e r t G u n t h e r ' s 
o r t h e i n s p e c t o r t h a t t h e c o m b u s t i o n a i r v e n t had been b l o c k e d . 
Had i t n o t been b l o c k e d , o r had G u n t h e r ' s been made aware of t h i s 
p r o b l e m and r e s o l v e d i t , t h e r e would have been no e x p o s u r e . V o l . 
2 , 1 9 6 - 9 7 , 2 1 3 - 1 6 , 2 4 2 - 4 3 , 2 4 9 - 5 2 , 2 5 4 - 5 6 , 2 7 0 - 7 3 ; V o l . 3 , 414 -
17 , 4 5 6 - 5 9 , 4 7 0 - 7 1 ; V o l . 9, 6 3 - 6 7 . 
The l a n d l o r d ' s b r o t h e r , an a r c h i t e c t a c t i n g on b e h a l f of t h e 
l a n d l o r d s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of t h e f u r n a c e , f a i l e d 
t o s t r e s s t o t h e o c c u p a n t s t h e i m p o r t a n c e of k e e p i n g t h e f u r n a c e 
room d o o r open u n t i l G u n t h e r ' s c o u l d r e s o l v e i t . V o l . 8, 2 2 8 - 3 4 . 
has a duty to exerc i se reasonable care to see that the premises are free 
of de fec t s or dangerous condit ions created by the landlord, or of which 
the landlord was aware, and which the landlord should reasonably foresee 
would expose others to an unreasonable r i sk of harm. 
R. 2245; Vol. 13, 110. After s e t t l i n g with the landlords, p l a i n t i f f s objected 
to the ir inc lus ion on the verdict form. Vol. 13, 112. 
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d. FAULT OF MARIE CAMERON. 
(1) INSTRUCTIONS. 
Plaintiffs sought the following jury instruction: 
If you find that any of the Defendants were negligent, 
you must decide if any of the Plaintiffs were also 
negligent. If a Plaintiff was negligent and that 
Plaintiff's negligence was a proximate cause of that 
Plaintiff's own injuries, that Plaintiff's negligence 
must be compared to the negligence of the Defendants. 
Each Defendant is liable to pay compensation based on 
that Defendant's own percentage of fault. 
R. 2017.6 
(2) EVIDENCE OF MARIE CAMERON'S FAULT. 
The prior oil burning furnace had created problems with 
fumes. Vol. 2, 248, 297-98; Vol. 7, 86, 107-08; Vol. 8, 242-44. 
No one alerted Gunther's or the inspector that the oil burning 
furnace had smoked and made residents ill. Vol. 2, 192-93, 243-
44, 247-48; Vol. 8, 242-44. This would have informed Gunther's 
and the inspector of combustion air problems. 
The landlord's brother informed Ms. Cameron there was 
insufficient combustion air and she should leave the door to the 
furnace room open until Gunther's could resolve the problem, 
6This instruction was given in substance without objection. R. 2253-52; 
Vol. 13, 107-12. 
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which she failed to do. Had she done so, there would have been 
sufficient combustion air. Vol. 8, 228-34. 
3. FACTS RELATING TO THE EXCLUSION OF RAMONA HOPKINS' 
TESTIMONY. 
Plaintiffs proffered Ms. Hopkins' testimony at Vol. 6, 187-
89, which identied nothing she could have added to the testimony 
of Drs. Weaver and Nilson, except her study, discussed below, and 
otherwise did not establish scientific reliability. Moreover, 
the experience from which she would have testified was based 
mostly on her dissertation which suffered from foundational and 
scientific reliability problems. 
Ms. Hopkins held no license as a psychologist or 
neuropsychologist (see Utah Code Ann. § 58-61-101), nor could she 
qualify for such a license because she lacked the clinical 
experience and post-doctoral training, and was precluded from 
diagnosing brain injury. Vol. 6, 177-186. H. 15-20.7 She had 
never been qualified as an expert in any court. H. 34-35. She 
wanted to opine that plaintiffs sustained permanent brain injury 
as a result of CO exposure, despite their never losing 
consciousness. She based her opinions upon research she had 
7Gunther's refers to Ms. Hopkins' deposition as WH." 
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conducted in her Ph.D t h e s i s , e n t i t l e d "Memory for Novel and 
Familiar Spa t i a l , L inguis t i c , and Geographical Temporal Distance 
Information in Hypoxic Subjects ."8 H. Exhibit 2. 
She began her study by se lec t ing two groups. The f i r s t 
group included 11 "Hypoxic Subjects ." P l a i n t i f f s Marie Cameron 
and Tina Cotton were among them. Cr i t e r i a for qualifying as an 
^Hypoxic Subject" were: 
--The person had a "s igni f icant" hypoxic event. If a doctor 
said the person had had a "s igni f icant" hypoxic event, tha t 
s a t i s f i e d t h i s c r i t e r i o n ; 
--The person scored at l e a s t one standard deviat ion below 
the "norm" on por t ions of the Denman memory t e s t . 9 Ms. Hopkins 
agreed, however, tha t within the un-brain-damaged population, 
c e r t a in people wi l l score a t l e a s t one standard deviat ion below 
and a ce r t a in number wi l l score at l e a s t one standard deviat ion 
above the "norm" ("bell curve" in the normal popula t ion) ; 
8Why Ms. Hopkins' testimony lacked foundation and was unre l iable requires 
more extens ive explanation because of the technical nature of her study. 
9This cr i t er ion assumed a causal re lat ionship between the undefined hypoxic 
event and the low t e s t score. Ms. Hopkins had each person s ign a consent form, 
e n t i t l e d "Memory Performance in Cerebral Cortex Damaged Pat ients Consent Form," 
which assumed brain damage, and informed the participant she had brain damage and 
as a re su l t thereof were par t i c ipat ing in a study of brain damaged people. H. 
Exhibit 2. 
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--The person had no previous h i s to ry of neurologic disorder , 
alcohol or drug abuse, or psych ia t r i c dis turbance. The r e s u l t s 
of t e s t i n g a person who had such a h i s to ry would be unre l iab le 
because of probable functional overlay. Further, i t could skew 
the r e s u l t s as to tha t person and/or as to the group as a whole, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y when dealing with such a small sampling.10 
--The person had no current untreated psychological problems 
which could skew the r e s u l t s as to tha t person and/or as to the 
group as a whole, p a r t i c u l a r l y when dealing with such a small 
sampling. H. 11-12, 14-15, 69-85, 93-107, 110-15, 117-20, and 
Exhibits 2, 3 and 4 t he re to . 
The second group included 11 ''Control Subjects ." Ms. 
Hopkins matched these 11 persons with the 11 "Hypoxic Subjects" 
by age, gender and leve ls of education, but not by body s i ze , 
cranium s i ze , body weight, smoking, alcohol use, or any other 
factor such as degree of depression, or subject ive motivations to 
do poorly on the t e s t s . One other c r i t e r i o n was tha t the person 
scored at or above the "norm" on the Denman memory t e s t . 
10Ms. Hopkins f a i l e d to obtain an adequate h i s tory of the study p a r t i c i -
pants . She learned af ter the study of Ms. Cameron's extensive neurological 
h is tory which predated the hypoxic event and, admittedly, could have skewed the 
resu l t s with, among other things, various functional overlay. She t e s t i f i e d that 
had she known of Ms. Cameron's prior neurological problems (white matter 
d i s ease ) , she would not have used her in the study. H. 98-100, 110-15. 
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Ms. Hopkins purposely excluded from the "Control Subjects" tha t 
segment of the un-brain-damaged population who would na tu ra l ly 
score below the "norm." Otherwise, there were no s t a t i s t i c a l 
standards for determining whether the se lec t ion of the control 
group was a f a i r cross sect ion of the populat ion. H. 118-20, 68-
90, 95-97, 102-07, 115-18, and Exhibit 2 t he r e to . 
Ms. Hopkins conducted MRI scans on s ix of the 11 "Hypoxic 
Subjects" and on the matching s ix "Control Subjects ." The MRI 
scans focused on the hippocampus, which i s believed to be 
involved in short term memory and information processing and 
sens i t ive to anoxic in jury. Using a cont rovers ia l method for 
measuring the physical dimensions of the hippocampus, she 
concluded tha t the "Hypoxic Subjects" as a group (six) had 
smaller hippocampuses than the "Control Subjects" as a group 
(six)."• She concluded tha t the hypoxic event had caused a 
reduction in the hippocampus s ize . 1 2 H. 122-29, and Exhibits 2-4 
t h e r e t o . 
"Although she was not trained or l i censed as a rad io log i s t , she purported 
to read the MRI scans and to measure the hippocampuses. 
12She agreed that the research method for measuring the hippocampus was 
subject to some controversy and had not been accepted for c l i n i c a l or diagnostic 
use . She a l s o agreed that there was a more advanced method ava i lab le for 
measuring the hippocampus than the one she had used. H. 122-29. 
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Ms. Hopkins then conducted ce r t a in t e s t s on each person in 
the "Hypoxic" group and the same t e s t s on each person in the 
*Control" group. She had developed some of the t e s t s herself , 
which were not standardized or general ly accepted for t h i s 
speci f ic appl ica t ion in the s c i e n t i f i c community, and were not 
developed for " r e l i a b i l i t y " and v a l i d i t y . She concluded tha t in 
some areas involving short- term memory and information 
processing, the "Hypoxic Subjects" as a group scored 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y s ign i f i can t ly lower than did the "Control Subjects" 
as a group. From t h i s , she concluded tha t the hypoxic event had 
caused the differences.1 3 H. at 69-89. Ms. Hopkins a lso agreed 
tha t the t e s t i n g she conducted was subject ive.1 4 H. 95-97. 
13She assumed a causal r e l a t i o n s h i p between the hypoxic event and the lower 
t e s t s c o r e s . She agreed, however, t h a t wi th in the un-brain-damaged popu la t ion , 
a c e r t a i n number of people w i l l score s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t than 
t h e "norm." Ms. Hopkins had no way of knowing whether each "Hypoxic Subject" 
would have scored the same p r i o r t o the hypoxic event . She had no way of knowing 
whether un-brain-damaged people who score a t l e a s t one s t andard d e v i a t i o n below 
the "norm" on the Denman memory t e s t s would a l s o score poor ly on the t e s t s she 
developed for the s tudy . She had no way of knowing whether un-brain-damaged 
people who n a t u r a l l y have smal ler hippocampuses would n a t u r a l l y score poor ly on 
the t e s t s she had developed. E . g . . H. 117-18 and Exhibi t 2 t h e r e t o . Therefore, 
an assumption t h a t t he hypoxic event caused the lower scores was not c a u s a l l y 
connected, s c i e n t i f i c a l l y j u s t i f i e d or v a l i d . 
"People who took the t e s t s on one day might achieve d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s on 
ano the r day. Fac tors a f f e c t i n g o n e ' s t e s t score might inc lude something as 
simple as a poor n i g h t ' s s l e e p , o n e ' s d e s i r e t o do we l l , or emotional problems 
such as depress ion which may be un re l a t ed t o purpor ted b r a i n damage. H. 95-97. 
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Ms, Hopkins could not say whether Marie Cameron's history of 
neurological disorders and psychiatric and psychological problems 
had skewed the results as to the "group" or Marie. Ms. Hopkins 
agreed that people with preexisting neurological problems should 
have been excluded from her study because the results of testing 
such people would be unreliable. H. 64-66, 93-95, 98-102, 110-
12, 113-15. 
Nonetheless, Ms. Hopkins concluded that the hypoxic event 
had caused permanent damage to the hippocampal region of the 
brain in the Hypoxic Subjects as a group. However, .the study did 
not purport to state that any specific person in the "Hypoxic" 
group experienced permanent brain damage to the hippocampus. Her 
study compared only "group" results. H. Exhibit 2. 
Ms. Hopkins personally never saw Kenyon, tested him or 
evaluated him. Based on her review of Kenyon7s psychometric 
testing data and information such as school records, she 
concluded that Kenyon's exposure caused him permanent brain 
damage. H. 205-07. 
Ms. Hopkins refused to produce the raw data underlying her 
testing and conclusions from which she drew her conclusions as to 
the groups or to any individuals, except as to Tina and Marie. 
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H. 1 2 1 - 2 2 , 1 3 0 - 1 3 3 . 1 5 Wi thou t t h e u n d e r l y i n g d a t a , G u n t h e r s 
c o u l d n o t v a l i d a t e Ms. H o p k i n s ' guesswork o r c o n c l u s i o n s . 
4 . ADMISSION OF QUANTITATIVE MRI BRAIN IMAGING DATA. 
G u n t h e r ' s o f f e r e d a v i d e o t a p e c o n t a i n i n g MRI s h e e t s Dr . 
B i g l e r had t a k e n of e a c h p l a i n t i f f . P l a i n t i f f s had been p r o v i d e d 
c o p i e s of t h o s e s h e e t s a t Dr . B i g l e r ' s d e p o s i t i o n . Mar ie Cameron 
had a p r e - e x p o s u r e MRI s c a n i n 1990, which was i n p l a i n t i f f s ' 
p o s s e s s i o n . A c o m p a r i s o n of t h e p r e - and p o s t - e x p o s u r e s c a n s , 
showing Mar ie Cameron ' s h ippocampa l s i z e , was o f f e r e d a s 
i l l u s t r a t i v e of Dr . B i g l e r ' s t e s t i m o n y t h a t t h e r e had been no 
s i g n i f i c a n t c h a n g e . A c o m p a r i s o n of t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' MRIs t o 
c e r t a i n norms was i n c l u d e d a s i l l u s t r a t i v e . Dur ing Dr. B i g l e r ' s 
d e p o s i t i o n , he t e s t i f i e d c o n c e r n i n g t h i s q u a n t i t a t i v e a p p r o a c h 
and a p a p e r he had s u b m i t t e d f o r p u b l i c a t i o n which more f u l l y 
15The underlying data was c r i t i c a l to va l idate and understand her study. 
Because of the extremely small sampling of people in the study, unusual t e s t 
r e s u l t s or measurements with respect to a very few people could skew the group 
r e s u l t s . "Hypoxic Subjects" who had been rendered unconscious may have skewed 
the group r e s u l t s , part icu lar ly for those who had not l o s t consciousness. A few 
people in the "Hypoxic" group could have scored unusually low on the t e s t s (which 
i s en t i re ly normal within the un-brain-damaged population). A few people in the 
"Control" group could have scored unusually high on the t e s t s (which i s en t i re ly 
normal within the un-brain-damaged populat ion) . Some of the people in the 
"Hypoxic" group may have had natural ly smaller physical dimensions, while some 
in the "Control" group may have had larger dimensions (ent ire ly normal within the 
un-brain-damaged populat ion) . Because of the small sampling of part i c ipants , 
r e l a t i v e l y s l i g h t d i f ferences could skew the group r e s u l t s . Without the data, 
Gunther's had no way of knowing. 
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explained the analysis, a copy of which plaintiffs did not 
request. Plaintiffs were given the quantitative information 
before trial, and had inquired about it during deposition. The 
court had not ordered exchange of exhibits. Thus, the 
information had not been "sprung on [plaintiffs] on the ninth day 
of trial." Vol. 10, 5-14. 
5. PUNITIVE DAMAGES CLAIM. 
Gunthers had no previous occurrence of an installation 
resulting in CO exposure. Vol. 3, 368. The installer here had 
19 years experience with Gunthers and had never had any 
complaints that his work had caused CO problems. Vol. 2, 184, 
196. The installer knew of the furnace's combustion air needs, 
specifically looked for combustion air sources, and assumed there 
was sufficient combustion air because to his knowledge that the 
room had accommodated the combustion air needs of the furnace he 
was replacing. He did not know the west wall vent had been 
blocked by a remodel. Vol. 2, 184-97. 
Plaintiffs did not allege the conduct of any defendant alone 
caused their injuries. Plaintiffs and their expert identified 
many factors which they claimed combined to cause injuries. It 
was the unusual combination of many factors which resulted in 
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circulation of CO through the home. It was a close line between 
safe and unsafe operation of the furnace. Plaintiffs' expert 
agreed that had any of the many contributing factors been 
different, the outcome would likely have been different, and 
plaintiffs would not have been injured. Vol. 4, 614-15. The 
combining factors included: 
--preexisting leakage in the return-air duct work which 
caused a negative pressure in the furnace room and allowed 
combustion gasses to infiltrate circulating air. An installer 
normally would not inspect the duct work of others unless he was 
on notice of a problem. Vol. 3, 479-83; Vol. 4, 574, 588; Vol. 
9, 13. 
--a preexisting blockage of a combustion air vent in the 
furnace room. The blockage could be found only by taking down 
the grate, and inserting one's head deep inside the opening in 
the concrete wall to peer through louvers. Mr. Bambenek 
testified that had the vent been unobstructed, sufficient 
combustion air would likely have existed and the accident 
probably would not have occurred. Mr. Robinette testified that 
absent the latent blockage sufficient combustion air would have 
existed to operate the furnace safely as did Gunther's expert who 
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conducted tests to make that determination. Vol. 2, 213-16, 242-
43, 249-52, 254-56, 298-99; Vol. 3, 532, 541-43, Vol. 4, 589-90; 
Vol. 9, 14-17, 71-72, 75-76. 
--the assumption by Gunther's installer that because 
sufficient combustion air existed for the preexisting oil 
furnace, sufficient combustion air existed for the replacement 
furnace, and his failure otherwise to meet code requirements. 
The assumption was rational and consistent with what others in 
the industry would have naturally assumed, including the 
inspector, who held myriad local, national and international 
building official certifications, was a promulgator of the 
Uniform Building and Mechanical Codes, instructed concerning the 
Uniform Mechanical Code, was the Chief Building Inspector for ten 
years in Utah County and chaired Utah's Education Licensing 
Committee for four years. He testified that if the old 
installation complied with the codes that were then in existence, 
the mechanical system's use could be continued with a change out. 
If such assumptions were incorrect, they were not maliciously so. 
Vol. 2, 213-14, 219-26, 231-36, 244-45, 253-54; Vol. 8, 248. 
Expert testimony attributed criticism to whoever had previously 
blocked the vent. Vol. 9, 14. 
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--a hidden opening in the return air system which created 
negative pressure. Vol. 9, 37. 
--the manner of the installer's draft test. Vol. 9, 13. 
--the manner of inspection, including the assumption of 
sufficiency of combustion air, and the failure to confirm Code 
compliance. Vol. 2, 213; Vol. 3, 543-44; Vol 4, 591; Vol. 9, 13. 
--the design and/or manufacturing characteristics of the 
Lennox furnace: 
--leakage in the combustion chamber, creating negative 
pressure in the furnace room and allowing combustion gasses to 
infiltrate the circulating air. 
Vol. 3, 514-19, 521-23, 540; Vol. 4, 573-79, 592-97, 599-605. 
--the excessive temperature setting and location of the 
spill switch, which should have shut off the furnace. Vol. 3, 
504-06, 540; Vol. 4, 579-83, 599, 605, 608-10; Vol 9, 20-33, 67-
71, 73-75. 
--the excessive temperature setting of the roll-out 
switch, which should have shut off the furnace. Vol. 3, 506-14; 
Vol 4, 605, 608-10. 
--insufficient delay between when the thermostat calls 
for heat (which begins burner operation and allows the heat 
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exchanger an opportunity to warm up before the blower starts), 
and the blower starting. Sufficient delay would have allowed the 
stack to warm up and draw combustion products up the flue. 
Actual delay was 23 seconds, instead of the represented 45 
seconds. Vol. 3, 526-27. 
--keeping the door to the furnace room closed, instead of 
opened as Mr. Viehwig had instructed Ms. Cameron. Vol. 2, 263-
64, 292; Vol. 3, 537; Vol. 8, 231-34. 
VIII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs waived a right to complain that the jury should 
have awarded general damages for three reasons. First, 
plaintiffs obtained a damages instruction that gave the jury 
discretion to award no general damages. Second, plaintiffs did 
not seek an instruction directing the jury to award general 
damages upon any condition. Third, plaintiffs waived the 
objection by failing to raise the claimed insufficiency and 
irregularity of the verdict before the jury was discharged. 
There is no fixed rule requiring an award of general damages 
if the jury awards special damages. 
Plaintiffs claim the verdict is not supported by the 
evidence in two respects, the jury's failure to award general 
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damages and the jury's apportionment of fault. Plaintiffs failed 
to marshal the evidence supporting the verdict. This Court 
should therefore assume the correctness of the verdict and the 
trial court's j udgment. 
Overwhelming evidence supports a finding of no general 
damages in that plaintiffs' only injury was they temporarily 
experienced flu-like symptoms as a result of their exposure which 
resolved shortly after they left the environment. 
The evidence supports the jury's assessment of fault of 
Robinette, the Viehwigs and Ms. Cameron, and Mr. Robinette was 
properly placed on the verdict form for an assessment of his 
proportionate share of fault. 
Ms. Hopkins' proposed testimony was cumulative. It also 
suffered serious problems with foundation and scientific 
reliability. The court properly excluded the testimony. 
Plaintiffs were not surprised by the quantitative MRI data, 
and the court properly admitted it. 
Finally, the court properly dismissed the punitive damages 
claim for lack of a prima facie case. 
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IX. ARGUMENT 
A. gENERAfr DAMAGES, 
1. PLAINTIFFS WAIVED THE GENERAL DAMAGES CLAIM. 
a. INSTRUCTIONS. 
Rule 51, Utah R.Civ.P., provides: xxno party may assign 
as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless 
he objects thereto." Objections "must be made before the 
instructions are given to the jury; otherwise, objections may be 
made to the instructions after they are given to the jury, but 
before the jury retires to consider its verdict." Plaintiffs 
proffered instructions which gave the jury discretion whether to 
award general damages and failed to object to Instruction 47 
before the jury began deliberations. See Fuller v. Zinik 
Sporting Goods Co.. 538 P.2d 1036 (Utah 1975). 
The court in Wheeler v. Huston. 605 P.2d 1339, 1346. (Or. 
1980), explained: 
[I]f the evidence . . . is such that reasonable people 
could not disagree that the defendant is legally liable 
for any injuries sustained by the plaintiff . . . the 
plaintiff should appropriately request that the jury be 
instructed that the defendant's liability has been 
established. In the absence of such a request, a 
verdict for the defendant is immune from attack by the 
plaintiff on the ground that the trial court failed to 
instruct the jury that the defendant's liability had 
been established and that the defendant was liable for 
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all injuries resulting from the defendant's fault. 
There is no reason why the question of the plaintiff's 
right to recover general damages or uncontroverted 
special damages should be treated any differently. We 
hold, therefore, that if the plaintiff claims that the 
right to recover general damages has been established 
as a matter of law, and that the jury must therefore 
award some general damages if they find the defendant 
liable, the plaintiff should request that an 
appropriate instruction be given to that effect. 
Plaintiffs failed to address this issue in the instruction phase 
and waived it. 
b. INSUFFICIENCY OR IRREGULARITY OF THE VERDICT. 
When the jury returned the first time, the verdict was 
incomplete. Plaintiffs asked the court to direct the jury to 
return a verdict awarding general damages after plaintiffs had 
learned the jury would likely award special damages. The court 
instead directed the jury to the original damages instructions. 
It was unknown what the jury would do because their deliberations 
were not completed; it was also unknown whether the jury would 
award some amount in general damages. After the jury returned, 
had placed xx0"s next to the lines for general damages and totaled 
the amounts, plaintiffs did not object to an "insufficiency" or 
"irregularity." They waived any right to object. 
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As the Court explained in Ute-Cal Land Dev. Corp. v. Sather. 
605 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980), Mi]t is the rule in Utah that a 
failure to object to a verdict, informal or insufficient on its 
face, before the jury is discharged, constitutes a waiver of that 
objection," The rationale for this was partly explained in 
Langton v. International Transport, Inc., 491 P.2d 1211, 1215 
(Utah 1971): 
If counsel be permitted to remain mute when a verdict 
is insufficient or informal, he gains an unfair 
strategic advantage, which the instant case clearly 
illustrates. The evidence of defendant's negligence 
was weak; the issue of whether the asserted negligence 
of plaintiff's injuries was weaker. The evidence of 
plaintiff's contributory negligence was considerable. 
It would be most advantageous to plaintiff to be 
granted a new trial, particularly if it were limited to 
the issue of damages. In either event, he would have 
an opportunity to present his case to a new jury. On 
the other hand, if the court had sent the jury out for 
further deliberation, with additional instructions 
setting forth clearly that the law does not permit the 
jury to compromise liability and that under the facts 
of this case the plaintiff, if entitled to special 
damages, must also receive compensation for his pain 
and suffering and lost wages, there was a real possi-
bility that the verdict might have been in favor of the 
defendant. The silence of plaintiff's counsel, upon 
hearing the verdict, is comprehensible, he could 
reasonably have concluded that the jury was unsympathe-
tic to his cause or parsimonious, and he would, of 
course, prefer a new jury. There must be reasonable 
rules to control the termination of litigation, if 
counsel has an opportunity to correct error at the time 
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of its occurrence and he fails to do so, any objection 
based thereupon is waived. 
Id. at 1215.16 
2 . THERE IS NO RULE MANDATING GENERAL DAMAGES IF THE 
JURY AWARDS SPECIAL DAMAGES. 
P l a i n t i f f s c l a i m Utah h a s a r u l e r e q u i r i n g an award of 
g e n e r a l damages i f t h e j u r y awards s p e c i a l damages . Utah h a s no 
s u c h r u l e . Such a r u l e makes no s e n s e where t h e i s s u e i s w h e t h e r 
p l a i n t i f f s s u f f e r e d g e n e r a l damages , and s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e 
shows p l a i n t i f f s were t e m p o r a r i l y i n c o n v e n i e n c e d b u t s u f f e r e d no 
p e r m a n e n t o r l o n g - t e r m e f f e c t s o r s u b s t a n t i a l p a i n and s u f f e r i n g . 
Such a r u l e would i n v a d e t h e j u r y ' s f a c t - f i n d i n g p r e r o g a t i v e and 
d i r e c t a v e r d i c t on a f a c t - i n t e n s i v e i n q u i r y . 
The l o g i c a l f l aw i s p l a i n t i f f s ' a s s u m p t i o n t h a t i f 
s u f f i c i e n t p r o o f e x i s t s of s p e c i a l damages , p l a i n t i f f s 
n e c e s s a r i i l y s u f f e r e d a compensab le quantum of g e n e r a l damages . 
Case law and l o g i c do n o t s u p p o r t such an e x t r e m e p o s i t i o n , and 
16See a l so Cohn v. J.C. Pennev Co., 537 P.2d 306, 311-12 (Utah 1975), where 
the Court explained: 
The verdict was def ic ient in form, and counsel had an opportunity to have 
the jury sent back for further de l iberat ions . This he did not do, perhaps 
fearing that the jury might e i ther award some nominal amount or even 
change the verdict and award nothing to the p l a i n t i f f . I t would be a 
smart t r i a l t a c t i c i f he could have had a new t r i a l on damages only before 
a jury which would not be acquainted with the weakness of p l a i n t i f f ' s 
cause of ac t ion . 
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as discussed below, there is no Utah case creating such a rule. 
Courts properly hold that plaintiff must prove the amount, if 
any, of special and general damages to which she is entitled. If 
sufficient proof exists of special damages, but insufficient 
proof exists of general damages, a rule mandating an award of 
general damages would undermine both the fact finder's role and 
the burden of proof. Many courts have affirmed verdicts that 
awarded medical expenses but no general damages because the proof 
failed to show the existence of substantial pain and suffering. 
In Hinson v. King. 603 So. 2d 1104, 1106-07 (Ala. App. 
1992), the jury awarded medical expenses, but no general damages. 
The court explained: 
[W]e must review the tendencies of the evidence most 
favorably to the prevailing party and indulge all 
inferences that the jury was free to draw. . . . 
The evidence is conflicting as to whether Hinson 
suffered permanent injury. Although we might agree 
that Hinson may be in discomfort, we cannot invade the 
province of the jury under these circumstances. A 
reviewing court can substitute its judgment for that of 
the jury on the question of damages only if the amount 
is so grossly inadequate in that it failed to give 
substantial compensation for substantial injuries. In 
the absence of evidence of substantial injuries in this 
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case, we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the 
jury. 
Id. at 1106-07.17 
Moreover, both the ins t ruc t ion requested by p l a i n t i f f s and 
tha t given by the court without objection were permissive, not 
mandatory, conveying the proper implication tha t damages were 
within the j u r y ' s d i s c re t ion . See Witt v. Martin. 672 P.2d 312, 
317-18 (Okla. App. 1983)(finding tha t p l a i n t i f f ' s own ins t ruc t ion 
was couched in terms of the permissive "may" ra the r than a 
mandatory " s h a l l , " which in par t was the cause of a verdic t 
awarding spec ia l s but no general damages). In t h i s regard, the 
question of damages i s properly l e f t to the jury: 
Pain and suffering have no known dimensions, mathe-
matical or f inanc ia l . There i s no exact r e l a t ionsh ip 
between money and physical or mental injury or suffer-
ing, and the various factors involved are not capable 
of proof in do l l a r s and cents . For t h i s very p r a c t i c a l 
reason the only standard for evaluation i s such amount 
as reasonable persons estimate to be f a i r compensation 
for i n ju r i e s suffered, and the law has entrusted the 
adminis t ra t ion of t h i s c r i t e r i o n to the impart ia l 
17See a l so Cunningham v. Conner, 309 A.2d 500 (D.C App. 1973) (affirming 
verd ic t which had awarded spec ia l but no general damages because the in jur ie s 
wwere not of a serious nature"); Giddinas v. Wyman. 177 N.E.2d 641 (111. 1961) 
("This jury may well have be l ieved that p l a i n t i f f s ' in jur i e s here were most 
minimal, to the point of being incapable of evaluation, and that p l a i n t i f f s would 
be f a i r l y compensated i f they only received t h e i r s p e c i a l s " ) ; Annot., Va l id i ty 
of Verdict Awarding Medical Expenses to Personal Injury P l a i n t i f f , but Fai l ing 
to Award Damages for Pain and Suffering. 55 A.L.R. 4th 186, § 5 (1987 and Supp. 
1993) (summarizing many such c a s e s ) . 
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conscience and judgment of jurors, who may be expected 
to act reasonably, intelligently and in harmony with 
the evidence. 
Domann v. Pence. 325 P.2d 321, 325 (Kan. 1958);18 
There is some level of discomfort which is so mild and 
temporary as not reasonably to warrant compensation. Plaintiffs 
were content with an instruction which left that issue to the 
jury, and appropriately so. 
Cases plaintiffs cite in support of an inflexible rule are 
inapposite. In Langton v. International Transport. Inc.. 491 
P.2d 1211 (Utah 1971) , plaintiff sustained head injuries, a 
concussion and lacerations. He was hospitalized for two days and 
could not work for nearly a month. He had dizziness, loss of 
balance and headaches which were consistent with a brain stem 
injury. His doctor testified he was not medically sound to work, 
had a 50% chance of recovery and any recovery would take two to 
three years. Unlike this case, whether plaintiff in Langton had 
sustained general damages did not appear to be in dispute. The 
jury returned a verdict awarding special but no general damages. 
18See also Brown v. Richards. 840 P.2d 143 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, 
denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993); Alaer v. Citv of Mukilteo. 730 P.2d 1333 (Wash. 
1987) (trial court should not substitute its view of appropriate damages for that 
of the jury and if verdict falls within range of proven damages, it should not 
be set aside). 
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When polled, two jurors indicated i t was not their verdict, six 
indicated i t was, but one of the six declared i t was a 
compromise. No one objected and the jury was dismissed. The 
Court concluded that plaintiff had waived any right to object. 
In dicta, the Court found that "under the facts of the case/' 
plaintiff would have been entitled to general damages upon an 
award of special damages, but also explained that if the jury 
found liabili ty and awarded special damages, and the court had 
sent them back to deliberate further on general damages, "there 
was a real possibility that the verdict might have been in favor 
of the defendant." Id^ at 1215.19 
Ute-Cal Land Dev. Corp. v. Slather. 605 P.2d 1240 (Utah 
1980)# also cited by plaintiffs as authority for this fixed rule, 
says no such thing. Instead of personal injury, the case 
involved land that had been used as collateral for a loan. This 
case, too, focused on waiver, and not on whether plaintiff in 
fact was entitled to general damages. The Court quoted Langton 
at length because of the similarity of waivers, but nowhere did 
19The i s sue in Lanaton was not whether p l a i n t i f f had suffered general 
damages, but whether the jury had rendered an inconsistent or incomplete verdict 
for some improper reason and whether p l a i n t i f f had preserved or waived the right 
to complain about i t . Because p l a i n t i f f ' s l i a b i l i t y case was so weak, the jury 
had compromised the verdic t , and p l a i n t i f f ' s s i l e n c e before the jury was 
discharged resul ted in a waiver. 
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the Court express the general view that if there had been no 
waiver an award of general damages was mandatory where there was 
an award of special damages, 
3. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JURY'S AWARD OF NO 
GENERAL DAMAGES. 
a. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND MARSHALING THE 
EVIDENCE; IN THE FACE OF APPELLANTS' FAILURE 
TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE, THE COURT SHOULD 
ASSUME THE CORRECTNESS OF THE VERDICT AND THE 
TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT. 
Plaintiffs moved for j.n.o.v. or new trial. Here they 
challenge only the denial of the new trial motion. This Court 
reverses only when discretion is abused. Hansen v. Steward, 761 
P.2d 14 (Utah 1988). This Court must consider the evidence in 
the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Id. at 17-
18. The standard of review for denial of a new trial motion 
which amounts to an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence 
requires appellant to **marshal all the evidence supporting the 
verdict' and then show that the evidence cannot support the 
verdict," before the appellate court can determine whether the 
trial court abused its discretion. Id. (citations omitted); 
Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assoc, 910 P. 2d 1252 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996); Steenblik v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872 (Utah 1995); AntQn vT 
Thomas. 806 P.2d 744, 747 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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T h i s Cour t e x p l a i n e d i n C h r i s t e n s e n v . Munns, 812 P . 2 d 69 
(Utah C t . App. 1 9 9 1 ) : 
[ A l p p e l l a n t s have f a i l e d t o m a r s h a l t h e e v i d e n c e a s 
r e q u i r e d by o u r s t a n d a r d of r e v i e w . When a p p e l l a n t 
a t t a c k s t h e e v i d e n c e , we b e g i n o u r a n a l y s i s w i t h t h e 
t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g of f a c t , n o t w i t h an a p p e l l a n t ' s 
v i ew of t h e way t h e t r i a l c o u r t s h o u l d have found . 
Ash ton v . A s h t o n , 733 P .2d 147, 150 (Utah 1 9 8 7 ) . . . . 
Due t o a p p e l l a n t ' s l a c k of c o m p l i a n c e w i t h o u r r u l e s on 
t h i s i s s u e , we assume t h e c o r r e c t n e s s of t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s j udgment . 
I d . a t 72-73 ( c i t i n g Rule 2 4 ( a ) ( 5 ) , Utah R. App. P . ) . 2 0 
A p p e l l a n t s f a i l e d t o m a r s h a l t h e e v i d e n c e , i n s t e a d a r g u i n g 
how t h e c o u r t s h o u l d have found b a s e d on what t h e y c o n s i d e r t o be 
t h e i r b e t t e r e v i d e n c e . T h e r e f o r e , t h i s Cour t s h o u l d assume t h e 
c o r r e c t n e s s of t h e v e r d i c t and t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t . 
b . THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS A VERDICT OF NO GENERAL 
DAMAGES. 
P l a i n t i f f s c a n n o t meet t h e i r d i f f i c u l t b u r d e n i n c h a l l e n g i n g 
t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e e v i d e n c e . E v i d e n c e which s t r o n g l y 
s u p p o r t s t h e v e r d i c t i s t h a t p l a i n t i f f s ' o n l y i n j u r y was t h e y 
t e m p o r a r i l y e x p e r i e n c e d f l u - l i k e symptoms a s a r e s u l t of t h e i r 
20See a l s o Al l r ed v . Brown, 893 P. 2d 1087, 1090 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 
("Brown does not address the suppor t ing evidence and merely renews h i s argument 
t h a t the evidence weighs more in h i s favor" ; t r i a l c o u r t ' s f ind ings uphe ld ) ; 
P h i l l i p s v . H a t f i e l d . 904 P.2d 1108 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (Court dec l ined t o 
cons ider the m e r i t s of appeal and aff irmed judgment of t r i a l cour t where 
a p p e l l a n t f a i l e d t o s a t i s f y marshal ing requirement) (and cases c i t e d t h e r e i n ) . 
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exposure which resolved shortly after they had left the 
environment, and plaintiffs suffered no permanent injury. This 
testimony came from Drs. Stewart, Bigler, McCusker, Thorn and 
Shadoff. Damages are within the jury's sound discretion. They 
were properly instructed they could not award damages based on a 
lack of proof or speculation or conjecture. On this evidence, 
the jury properly could find, as it did, that plaintiffs were 
entitled to payment for their hospital bills but had failed to 
prove any quantum of compensable general damages. The trial 
court clearly had a reasonable basis to deny plaintiffs' motion 
for new trial and therefore did not abuse its discretion. See 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). 
B. THE JURY'S DISTRIBUTION OF FAULT AMONG THE DEFENDANTS 
AND ONE PLAINTIFF WAS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
1. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE. 
See discussion concerning standard of review and marshaling 
the evidence, above. This Court should assume its correctness 
and that of the trial court's judgment. 
2. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JURY'S DISTRIBUTION OF 
FAULT. 
There may be multiple proximate causes of an injury. 
Plaintiffs alleged against Robinette breach of a duty of care and 
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proximate causation, prayed for damages against him and submitted 
instructions concerning his fault and superseding cause. Proof 
of his fault was presented to the jury. Evidence of the 
inspector's fault was very similar to what plaintiffs presented 
as Gunther's fault, except that he had ultimate authority to 
approve or disapprove the installation. The inspector was 
responsible not to unlock the gas valve and permit the furnace's 
operation if the installation was unsafe. He failed to discover 
the inadequacy of the combustion air. He made the same 
assumption Gunther's installer had made concerning adequacy of 
combustion air for safe operation because the room had 
accommodated the oil burning furnace, which would have had 
similar or identical combustion air requirements. The jury 
agreed with plaintiffs' allegations, finding Robinette at fault 
and that his fault was one of several contributing causes. 
Evidence concerning Marie Cameron's fault was two-fold. 
First, she failed to inform Gunther's or the inspector of any 
prior problems with the oil burning furnace. Second, she was 
warned to keep the furnace door open until Gunther's could 
resolve the combustion air issue, which she failed to do. 
-43-
Finally, the landlords had a duty to provide safe living 
quarters for their tenants, which they failed to satisfy. They 
failed to discover or disclose to Gunther's the latent blockage 
of the combustion air vent. They failed to disclose to Gunther's 
any prior combustion air problems with the oil burning furnace. 
The landlord's brother, who was acting in his brother's behalf, 
failed to stress to Ms. Cameron the importance of keeping the 
furnace room door open until Gunther's could resolve the combus-
tion air problem. 
Proximate cause is a fact question for the jury. Apache 
Tank Lines. Inc. v. Cheney. 706 P.2d 614 (Utah 1985); Harris v. 
Utah Transit Authority. 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983). The court 
clearly had a reasonable basis for denying plaintiffs' new trial 
motion and therefore did not abuse its discretion. Crookston v. 
Fire Ins. Exchange. 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). 
C. ROBINETTE WAS PROPERLY ON THE VERDICT FOR AN ASSESSMENT 
OF HIS FAULT 
Plaintiffs' claim that Robinette was immune from suit is 
raised for the first time here and should not be considered. 
Plaintiffs objected to the court's failure to instruct that Mr. 
Robinette could not be liable unless there were bad faith or 
malice within the meaning of the Mechanical Code. 
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P l a i n t i f f s sued Robinette for negligence, prayed for damages 
and submitted ins t ruc t ions concerning h is f a u l t . The jury heard 
proof of h is fau l t . 2 1 During the ins t ruc t ion phase, p l a i n t i f f s 
objected to the issue of h i s negligence going to the jury,2 2 but 
not to h is inclusion on the ve rd ic t . The jury found tha t h is 
conduct cons t i tu ted faul t and was one of several proximate 
causes. P l a i n t i f f s waived a claim of immunity as to Robinette. 
Another problem with p l a i n t i f f ' s argument i s tha t the Nephi 
Mechanical Code upon which p l a i n t i f f s r e ly to a s se r t Robinet te ' s 
immunity, could not and did not amend Tort Reform to reintroduce 
j o in t and several l i a b i l i t y or require Gunther's to pay more than 
i t s proport ionate share . A municipali ty has no such power. See 
Algood v. Larson. 545 P.2d 530, 531 (Utah 1976); Lark v. 
Whitehead, 502 P.2d 557 (Utah 1972); Murray City v. Hall , 663 
P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah 1983). 
21The Court explained in Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank v. Mehr. 
791 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah Ct. App. 1990): 
Generally, in the l ega l proceedings a party with knowledge of the fac t s 
w i l l not be allowed to take a pos i t ion , pursue that pos i t i on to f ru i t i on , 
and l a t e r , with no substant ia l change in circumstances, return to attack 
the v a l i d i t y of the prior p o s i t i o n or the outcome flowing from i t . 
"During the ins truct ion phase, p l a i n t i f f s attempted to ra i se aff irmative 
defenses to the i r negl igence claims against Robinette. 
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Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37 et seq., Robinette was 
properly on the verdict for an assessment of his fault. "No 
defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount 
in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to that 
defendant." Id. § 78-27-38. Indeed, "the maximum amount for 
which a defendant may be liable to any person seeking recovery is 
that percentage or proportion of the damages equivalent to the 
percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that defendant." 
Id. § 78-27-40. 
If Robinette were immune from suit, or could be held liable 
only under some lower standard of care, it would make no 
difference to the assessment of fault. Regardless of whether 
Robinette must pay for his fault, it still was properly assessed. 
See Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993) . 
D. THE COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED RAMONA HOPKINS/ TESTIMONY. 
Aside from Ms. Hopkins' study, plaintiffs7 proffer estab-
lished nothing that would not be repetitive of the testimony of 
Drs. Weaver and Nilson. Thus, the court did not abuse its 
discretion in excluding the evidence as cumulative. 
Absent an abuse of discretion, the Court will not disturb 
the trial court's determination concerning whether a witness has 
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adequate qualifications and whether the proffered testimony 
exceeds the witness' qualifications. Rule 104, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, provides: "preliminary questions concerning . . . the 
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court." The 
Court explained in State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 396 (Utah 
1989): 
One danger being guarded against is the tendency of the 
finder of fact to abandon its responsibility to decide 
the critical issues and simply adopt the judgment of 
the expert despite an inability to accurately appraise 
the validity of the underlying science. . . . 23 
The trial court admitted the evidence over objection, 
apparently on the erroneous assumption . . . that the 
lack of foundation went to the weight, not to the 
admissibility of the evidence. As a result, a foun-
dation demonstrating the necessary reliability is 
entirely lacking. We are therefore forced to conclude 
that the trial court erred in permitting the experts to 
give opinions of abuse based on their purportedly 
scientific appraisals of the daughter's truthfulness 
when she made her allegations. This testimony should 
have been excluded under rule 702. 
Rimmasch involved the question whether the State's "expert" 
should be permitted to testify concerning a profile purportedly 
typical of abused children. In setting the standard for 
admission of scientific evidence, the Court explained that 
""without more than credentials and a subjective opinion, an expert's 
testimony that xit is so' is not admissible." Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co.. 826 
F.2d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 1987). 
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"evidence not shown to be reliable cannot, as a matter of law, 
*assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue' and, therefore is inadmissible." Id. 
at 397-98. Thus, the proponent must establish the inherent 
reliability of the evidence. As to this threshold, the Court 
stated: 
[T]here is a continuing need for a threshold reliabil-
ity requirement applicable to scientific evidence to 
ensure that trial courts do not uncritically accept as 
sufficiently trustworthy for submission to the trier of 
fact the supposedly scientific assertions of anyone who 
can qualify as an expert in a particular field of 
scientific endeavor . . . 
We remain wary of the potential of such evidence to 
distort the fact-finding process by reason of its 
superficial plausibility and its potential for inducing 
the fact-finders to accept the experts' judgments of 
critical issues rather than making their own. And we 
are convinced that trial courts sometimes admit 
"scientific" evidence without scrutinizing its foun-
dations carefully. It is for these reasons that we 
have imposed the threshold reliability requirement. 
Id. at 397 n.6, 3 99. The proponent of the evidence must meet the 
threshold in one of two ways: (1) a request that the trial court 
take judicial notice of the "inherent reliability'' of the founda-
tional principles or techniques or, (2) "request that the trial 
court determine that these principles or techniques are 
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inherently reliable after an evidentiary hearing addressing the 
issue." IJLL. at 398.24 
The Court noted that "a very high level of reliability is 
required before judicial notice can be taken." Id. Judicial 
notice of uinherent reliability" is available only to methodology 
or science as to which there is general acceptance in the 
scientific community as a reliable means for determining the 
condition at issue. Id. Ms. Hopkins' purported means for 
determining the fact, type and degree of brain damage to a small 
sampling of persons who had differing and unspecified hypoxic 
events had never been determined reliable by the scientific 
community. She could point to no consensus in the scientific 
community which supported her methodology, conclusions or 
assumptions. Indeed, this was the subject of a dissertation, 
which by definition purported to explore new territory. 
Plaintiffs could not show her principles or techniques were 
inherently reliable. As the Rimmasch Court explained: 
In fine, the trial court should carefully explore each 
logical link in the chain that leads to the expert 
testimony given in court and determine its reliability. 
Only with such information can the overall decision on 
admissibility be made intelligently. In the absence of 
24Plaintiffs' proffer did neither. 
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such showing by the proponent of the evidence and a 
determination by the court as to its threshold reli-
ability, the evidence is inadmissible. 
UL. at 403. 
The trial court properly found gaps and assumptions in the 
"logical link in the chain" that led to Ms. Hopkins' conclusions. 
Beyond the fact that the scientific community had not validated 
her conclusions, Ms. Hopkins admitted to factors in her 
techniques and methodology which showed that neither the science 
nor her conclusions were inherently reliable. She opined that 
(1) people with hypoxic events have smaller hippocampuses than 
people without such events, (2) people with hypoxic events test 
below people who have not had such events, and (3) those people 
have permanent brain damage as a result of the hypoxic events. 
She gave these opinions despite the lack of logical links. 
Under the most rudimentary principles of logic, her testimony 
could not meet the threshold standard of scientific reliability: 
--The "Hypoxic Subjects" had differing types and degrees of 
hypoxic events (cardiac or pulmonary arrest, CO), some were 
rendered unconscious; others were not; 
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--The "control subjects'' were matched only by age, gender, 
and levels of education; they were not matched by body size, 
cranium size, lifestyle or any other factor; 
--Ms. Hopkins assumed a causal relationship between the 
hypoxic event and the low Denman memory test score: one could not 
be in the study as an "Hypoxic Subject" unless she scored low on 
the test. Yet she agreed that a certain number of people within 
the un-brain-damaged population will score at least one standard 
deviation below and a certain number will score at least one 
standard deviation above the "norm." She had no way of knowing 
whether each person in her study, or any of them, would have 
scored at least one standard deviation bel ow the "norm" on the 
Denman memory test prior to the hypoxic event; 
--She agreed she had no way of knowing whether the "Hypoxic 
Subjects"' hippocampus size was the same pre- and post-hypoxic 
event; 
--Ms. Hopkins agreed that the method for measuring the 
physical dimensions of the hippocampus was controversial, had not 
been accepted for clinical or diagnostic use and there was a more 
advanced method; 
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--Un-brain-damaged people in the general population have 
different body sizes, different cranium sizes and different 
hippocampus sizes; 
--She agreed she could not rule out that people in the un-
brain-damaged population who naturally score at least one 
standard deviation below the "norm" on the Denman memory test may 
have smaller hippocampuses than people who score within the 
"norm"; 
--She admitted she had developed many of the tests, they 
were not standardized or generally accepted for the specific 
application in the scientific community and they were not 
developed for "reliability"; 
--She assumed a causal relationship between the hypoxic 
event and the lower scores on the tests she had developed for the 
study; 
--She did not know whether each person in her study, or any 
of them, would have scored the same prior to the hypoxic event. 
She did not know whether un-brain-damaged people who score at 
least one standard deviation below the "norm" on the Denman 
memory test would also score poorly on the tests she had 
developed. She did not know whether un-brain-damaged people who 
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naturally have smaller hippocampuses would naturally score poorly 
on the tests she developed; 
--She agreed that her testing was subjective, people who 
took the tests on one day might achieve different results on 
another day, factors affecting one's test score might include 
something as simple as a lack of sleep, one's desire or lack of 
desire to do well, or emotional problems such as depression which 
may be unrelated to brain damage; 
--She could not say whether Ms. Cameron's history of 
neurological, psychiatric and psychological problems skewed the 
results as to the "group" or as to Marie, and she agreed that 
people with neurological problems should not have been "subjects" 
because the results were unreliable; 
--She refused to produce the data underlying her 
conclusions, with the exception of data on Tina and Marie. 
--The study did not purport to state that any specific 
person in the "Hypoxic" group experienced permanent brain damage 
to the hippocampus. She compared only "group" results. 
Yet, she concluded that plaintiffs were brain damaged. 
Plaintiffs could not meet the threshold reliability for 
-53-
admissibility of Ramona Hopkins' testimony. It was junk science 
and properly excluded. 
Courts review the adequacy of a factual basis for an expert 
opinion to determine its admissibility, and reject the evidence 
if the factual or theoretical basis is without probative force 
and reliability. Rules 104, 401, 403, 702 and 703, Utah R.Evid., 
provide the court the mandate, means and justification for such 
an inquiry. The quality of facts an expert relies upon and the 
assumptions made in arriving at an opinion are subject to 
judicial review. 
The factual basis for Ms. Hopkins' opinions was completely 
lacking.25 This was a classic example of presupposing a 
conclusion by including people in the study who satisfied the 
conclusion.26 Ms. Hopkins assumed that because an accident had 
25Many courts reject expert opinion in whole or part because certain facts 
were assumed by the expert without sufficient foundation. See Nichols Constr. 
Corp. v. Cessna Aircraft Co.. 808 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1985); Washington v. 
Armstrong World Industries. Inc.. 839 F.2d 1121, 1123-34 (8th Cir. 3988) (citing 
Soden v. Freightliner Corp.. 714 F.2d 498, 502 (5th Cir. 1983)); Owens v. Bourns. 
Inc.. 166 F.2d 145 (4th Cir.), cert, denied. 474 U.S. 1038 (1985); Andrews v. 
Metro North Commuter Ry. Co.. 882 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1989); Hull v. Merck & 
Co. . 758 F.2d 1474, 1477 (11th Cir. 1985); Cunningham v. Rendevous, Inc., 699 
F.2d 676, 678 (4th Cir. 1983); Merit Motors v. Chrysler Corp., 569 F.2d 666, 673 
(D.C. Cir. 1977). 
26See Olvmpia Equip. Leasing v. Western Union Telegraph, 797 F.2d 370, 382 
(7th Cir. 1986), cert, denied. 480 U.S. 934 (1987). In Olympia, an anti-trust 
case, the court determined that the "the expert in this case dazzled the jury 
with xan array of figures conveying a delusive impression of exactness'--delusive 
because the figures had no relation to reality." In essence, the "expert" 
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occurred in some unspecified degree, i t caused brain damage. She 
then embarked on a s e r i e s of assumptions to find a causal 
r e l a t ionsh ip between the unspecified "s igni f icant" hypoxic event 
and purported neuropsychological def ic iencies exhibi ted by the 
people she hand se lec ted; yet , people who did not exhibi t those 
def ic iencies were excluded from her study.27 Her testimony could 
not be of the type reasonably r e l i ed upon by experts in the 
f i e l d . Rule 703. Her opinions lacked foundation and s c i e n t i f i c 
r e l i a b i l i t y , were p r e jud i c i a l , would have been of no ass is tance 
to the t r i e r of fact and were properly excluded. Thus the court 
did not abuse i t s d i sc re t ion in excluding her testimony. See 
Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp.. 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 
1993); Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp.. 801 P.2d 920 
(Utah 1990); Anton v. Thomas. 806 P.2d 744 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
s e l e c t i v e l y ident i f i ed factors and made improper assumptions which supported h i s 
presupposed conclusion, then incorporated them into h i s est imate . The court 
concluded that the "record contain[ed] no bas is for a rational estimation of [the 
p l a i n t i f f ' s purported] damages." Id. at 383. 
27See. e . g . , Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., 781 P.2d 445 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (expert testimony concerning "moth phenomenon," offered to explain why-
driver veered off highway and struck a parked truck, was properly excluded for 
lack of foundation; there was no evidence that the driver was awake prior to the 
night-time accident or that parked truck had l i g h t s on which would lure dr iver) . 
cert , denied. 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); Calhoun v. Honda Motor Co.. 738 F.2d 126 
(6th Cir. 1984) (expert opined that brakes f a i l e d because they were wet but there 
was no evidence that they in fact were wet); Farmers Ins. Co. v. Smith, 549 P.2d 
1026 (1976) (opinion that cause of f i r e was a condition of panel box was rejected 
where no factual bas i s e x i s t e d to support i t ) . 
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Indeed, the court would have abused its discretion by admitting 
the testimony.28 
Finally, based on the proffer, nothing Ms. Hopkins had to 
say would have affected the outcome; so even if the court had 
erred by excluding the testimony, it was harmless. Anton v. 
White. 806 P.2d 744 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (harmless error if 
evidence could not have influenced a different verdict). 
E. THE COURT PROPERLY LIMITED PLAINTIFFS' REBUTTAL CASE. 
Gunther's adopts the argument of Lennox. 
F. THE COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED QUANTITATIVE MRI DATA. 
As discussed, the admission and exclusion of evidence is 
within the trial court's sound discretion. The court did not 
abuse its discretion by admitting the quantitative MRI data. 
Plaintiffs had been provided the MRI sheets at Dr. Bigler's 
deposition. Marie Cameron had a pre-exposure MRI scan in 1990, 
which was also in plaintiffs' possession. A comparison of the 
pre- and post-exposure MRI scans, showing Marie Cameron's 
hippocampus, was offered to support Dr. Bigler's testimony that 
there had been no structural change. A comparison of the 
^Defendants' "scathing and unrelenting effort . . . to exclude her," 
Appellants' Brief, 48, was not because of the scientific reliability of her 
testimony. It was because of the opposite. 
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plaintiffs' MRIs to certain norms was also included. During 
Dr. Bigler's deposition, he testified concerning this quan-
titative approach and a paper he had submitted for publication 
which more fully explained the analysis, a copy of which 
plaintiffs failed to request. Plaintiffs were provided the 
quantitative information before trial, and had inquired about it 
during Dr. Bigler's deposition. The court had set no date or 
order to exchange trail exhibits. 
For these reasons, plaintiffs cannot claim surprise "on the 
ninth day of trial," or that the court abused its discretion by 
admitting the evidence.29 
G. THE COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
£LMM. 
1. BURDEN OF PROOF AND STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
The Court must consider the quantum and quality of proof in 
light of the "eventual standard of proof at trial on the merits 
on each element" of plaintiffs' claim--here clear and convincing 
evidence, RpfrinffQn vf Intermcpunt^jn Health C^re, Ing., 740 P. 2d 
262, 264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1. 
Robinson cites with approval Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.. 477 
29Anderson v. Bradley. 590 P.2d 339 (Utah 1979) (there is no surprise when 
ordinary prudence can guard against it). 
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U.S. 242 (1986) . Anderson was a libel action which had a clear 
and convincing standard. The Court held: 
Just as the "convincing clarity" requirement is rele-
vant in ruling on a motion for directed verdict, it is 
relevant in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.... 
[A] trial judge must bear in mind the actual quantum 
and quality of proof necessary to support liability 
under New York Times. For example, there is no genuine 
issue if the evidence presented in the opposing 
affidavits is of insufficient caliber or quantity to 
allow a rational finder of fact to find actual malice 
by clear and convincing evidence. 
Thus, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the 
judge must view the evidence presented through the 
prism of the substantive evidentiary burden. This 
conclusion is mandated by the nature of this deter-
mination. ... It makes no sense to say that a jury 
could reasonably find for either party without some 
benchmark as to what standards govern its deliberations 
and within what boundaries its ultimate decision must 
fall, and these standards and boundaries are in fact 
provided by the applicable evidentiary standard. 
Id. at 254-55. 
There was uno reasonable probability" that plaintiffs could 
have prevailed on their punitive damage claim. See Snyder v. 
Merkley. 693 P.2d 64 (Utah 1984). Under the standard of proof, 
the law governing punitive damages and the facts, the court 
properly granted a directed verdict. Any factual disputes did 
not rise to the level of materiality under applicable rules of 
law. See Norton v. Blackham. 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983). 
-58-
I"lh" IMA KAC1U CAUK Ml-' PUN I'm ""K DAMAGES . 
The Utah Supreme Court stated, "punitive damages are the 
exception rather than, the rule and should be Imposed cautiously,, 
ii II Il ' II I Uehieuu v , Ra le lull H i l l s I losp. Ii IC. 5 ; 5 I 2 > :I Ill Ill Ill SI , 
1186 (Utah 1983j . Thus, the court plays a significant protective 
role i n a. case allegd ng punitive damages: 
In cases properly involving punitive damages claims :i t 
Is within the province of the jury to determine the 
proper amount of puniti ve damages. The question of the 
sufficiency of evidence to justify an award of /xem-
plary damages, however, i s a question '•*' law fc the 
court. 
A l l e y v , Gubser Dev. Co, , 78 5 IF. 2 d 8 4 9 (101: : i ) c e r t , d e n i e d , 
i i n il ii'itiiii , ,;ee a i s o w n s o n v . u ldruyd , 2 6 7 1?, A d 7 5 9, 
764 (Utah 1 9 5 4 ) . 
The "plaintiff must present :r.;fficient evidence tc establish 
cause submitted t ,: consideration by tnu jui^." Lindsay v. 
vjiobons ana AL- . ,.q ^n flQr?^ A prima facie case 
requires that eacn element of Lhe cause : • - < 
^substantial evidence" "Absent substantial evidence of any 
. , . T .;*•_ .. e ::. .n 
_ 5 9_ 
impermissible speculat ion and conjec ture . ' " 3 0 Gregory v. 
Fourthwest Investments. Ltd . . 754 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) ( c i t a t ion omit ted) . 
To p reva i l , p l a i n t i f f s had to (1) e s t ab l i sh l i a b i l i t y , 
(2) show "that the ac t s or omissions of [Gunther's was] the 
r e s u l t of wi l l fu l and malicious or i n t en t i ona l l y fraudulent 
conduct, or conduct which manifest[ed] a knowing and reckless 
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the r i g h t s of o the r s , " 
and (3) do so "by c lea r and convincing evidence."31 Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-18-1. Gunther's conduct in no wise reached t h i s l eve l , 
and the puni t ive damages claim was properly dismissed. 
The Utah Supreme Court ' s most thorough analys is of the 
puni t ive damages doctr ine i s in Behrens v. Raleigh Hi l l s Hosp. 
I n c . . 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983): 
30This Court defined ''substantial evidence" as "evidence . . . which 
furnishes a substant ia l bas i s of fact from which the i s sues tendered can 
reasonably be resolved." Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments. Ltd. , 754 P.2d 89, 
92 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The Court affirmed the t r i a l court ' s d irected 
v e r d i c t for defendant, concluding that the fact that a l o s s occurred i s 
in su f f i c i en t as a matter of law to support a finding of negligence and causation. 
31In Greener v. Greener. 212 P.2d 194, 205 (Utah 1949), the Court s ta ted: 
For a matter to be c lear and convincing to a part icular 
mind i t must at l e a s t have reached the point where there 
remains no ser ious or substant ia l doubt as to the 
correctness of i t s conclusion. 
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[T] he gei ler al rule is that only compensatory damages 
are appropriate and that punitive damages may be 
awarded only in exceptional cases. It is not the point 
to allow pun iti we damages to be awarded to increase the 
sorrow that defendants generally suffei: when an injury 
has been inflicted by error or inadvertence, or to give 
a plaintiff an in terrorem weapon in settlement nego-
tiations. Since punitive damages are not intended as 
additional compensation to plaintiff, they must., i f 
awarded, serve a societal interest of punishing and 
deterring outrageous and malicious conduct which li s i lot 
likely to* be deterred by other means 
Our cases have generally he] d that puni tive damages maj 
be awarded only on proof of "willful and malicious, 
conduct . . . or on proof of conduct which manifests 
a knowing and reckless indifference tow ard. a nd dis-
regard of, the ri ghts of others 
Id. at 1186. The Court continued: 
Punitive damages should be awarded infrequently. 
Simple negligence will never suffice as a basis upon 
which such damages may be awarded. "Punitive damages 
are not: awarded for mere inadvertence, mistake, errors 
of judgment and the like, which constitute ordinary . 
negligence ," , . A defendant's conduct must be 
malicious or in reckless disregard fox the rights of 
others, although actual intent: to cause injury is not 
necessary That is, th*.1. defendant must either 
know or should know "that such conduct would, in a high 
degree of probability, result in substantial, harm to 
another," . . .  and the conduct must be "highly 
unreasonable conduct, or an extreme departure from. 
ordinary care, i n a situation where a high degree of 
danger is apparent • • . 
I L L I I 1 MI 
32ln
 Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel, and Tel. Co., 709 P 
330 (Utah 1985), the Court added the following definition of what it meant by 
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In Gleave v Denver & Rio Grande Western Rv. Co., 749 P.2d 
660 (Utah Ct. App.), c e r t , denied. 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988), 
t h i s Court summarized Behren /s three conjunctive elements of 
puni t ive damage claims in Utah, absent ac tual malice: 
[T]he defendant must e i t h e r know or should know "that 
such conduct would, [1] in a high degree of p robab i l i t y 
r e s u l t in subs tan t i a l harm to another ," . . . and 
[2] the conduct must be "highly unreasonable conduct or 
an extreme departure from ordinary care,3 3 [3] in a 
s i t u a t i o n where a high degree of danger i s apparent."34 
extreme d e p a r t u r e from o rd ina ry ca re" means: 
"Gross negl igence i s the f a i l u r e t o observe even s l i g h t c a r e ; i t i s 
c a r e l e s s n e s s or r e c k l e s s n e s s t o a degree t h a t shows u t t e r 
i n d i f f e r e n c e t o the consequences t h a t may r e s u l t . " . . . Wi l l fu l 
misconduct goes beyond gross negl igence in t h a t a defendant must be 
aware t h a t h i s conduct w i l l probably r e s u l t in i n j u r y . 
Id . a t 335-36. 
33In evaluating the type and degree of potential fault in a punitive damage 
claim, courts conclude that a defendant's exercise of some care to avoid injury 
generally vitiates, as a matter of law, a plaintiff's claim of "willfulness," 
"maliciousness," or "'knowing and reckless disregard for the rights of others." 
Oversight or failure to do what a reasonable person would do under the 
circumstances may constitute some degree of fault, such as negligence, but does 
not approach the egregious or outrageous type of conduct necessary to sustain a 
claim for punitive damages. Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers. Inc.. 414 F. 
Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Ballenaer v. Mobil Oil Corp.. 488 F.2d 707 (5th Cir.), 
cert, denied. 416 U.S. 986 (1974); White v. B. K. Trucking Co.. 405 F. Supp. 1068 
(W.D. Okla. 1975). 
34In Gleave. plaintiff was injured at a railroad crossing. Plaintiff 
sought punitive damages against the railroad for failure to make appropriate 
safeguards. The Gleave Court evaluated the three Behrens elements: 
(1) High degree of probability. There was uncontroverted 
testimony that there had been no accidents at this crossing up to 
the time of UDOT's inspection and evaluation in 1974. After that 
time, Rio Grande installed stop signs as a temporary measure until 
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"LAINTJFFS FAILED • STATE A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST GIJNTHER'S. 
The murl , II! il n:; ' • f 
the above principj e.", -.:.d ^ ur^^julail- *_!.•_ u.^ i.date that "'^ur^Lxve 
damages are the exception rather «-han *~u^
 r-i~ -,r^  ~u.oi:1^  *" 
imposed cautiously, ±±. di di± Lihll^ j-' 
>v- • /\JDENCF 01 A HIJH DEGREE OF 
PROBABIL'; 
At b -,:.-
possibility particularly where *_]:*'<:• / . ;__ C_ p_'cfcie..:s 
UDOT upgraded the cr: ossing with flasning iea ^i^nts. Gleave's 
attorney claimed he would offer evidence at trial of "near misses" 
at the crossing, but none was produce,] TN.- ; uca ity vvas rural, and 
the road not heavily traveled. There i:; 10 > . ide ce that Rio Grande 
knew or should have known of facts discovered by Gleave's experts 
after this accident, In any event, the evidence shows a. low degree 
of probability, 
(-" Highly unreasonable conduct or extreme departure from ordinary 
care. At worst, the evidence shows errors of judgment, i.e., 
ordinary negligence on the part of Rio Grande, in failing to take 
steps to reduce the risks at this crossing. There is no evidence of 
an extreme departure from, ordinary care 
(3) High degree of danger apparent... A degree of danger exists at 
every railroad crossing. The evidence showed the degree of danger 
at. this crossing was high. The crossing was more than ordinarily 
hazardous. But was the extent of that danger readily apparent prior 
to this accident? Perhaps reasonable minds could differ concerning 
this prong of the Behrens test, bi it tv^ r • . .-.
 liV- i-r,-*ngS remain 
unsatisfied, 
JJL. a- (":'•]. Two \>i i.:.-f *;.• — conjunctly. v-^ c^ .^ wL.. WCX*- .uissin^ »* a matter ul 
la. r-iciintiff could r.ot establish the requisite "willfulness," "maliciousness," 
•: ""--nowjLng and leckle^s disregard for the rights of others." 
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with Gunther's installations or this installer that would have 
put Gunther's on notice; (2) this installer had 19 years on the 
job; (3) he was unaware of latent defects, such as the blocked 
vent and the hole in the return air system, and he specifically 
looked for and there appeared to be sufficient combustion air; 
other industry people agreed the assumption was rational and 
reasonable; (4) there were no complaints by tenants or the 
landlords to place Gunther's on notice that the ventilation to 
the prior furnace was insufficient; (5) the installer conducted a 
draft test and concluded there was sufficient draw; (6) the 
installer's work would be and was inspected by a City inspector, 
who made the same assessment concerning ventilation; (7) safety 
redundancy was built into applicable codes; (8) the Lennox blower 
housing door had "unusual" and significant leaks; (9) preexisting 
duct work had leaks; (10) the safety features of the Lennox 
heater--the spill switch and roll-out switch--did not shut off 
the furnace automatically when there was a reverse draft; (11) 
the blower came on before the stack was adequately heated; (12) 
Ms. Cameron did not keep the door opened after being instructed 
to do so; (13) it took a combination of the foregoing to result 
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i , '" ' | • .I.J.' , | «j r.iii I , L1 i a c t o i s been 
d i f f e r e n t , t h e a c c i d e n t would n o t have o c c u i ^ e d . 
For t h e s e r ea sons , , i t c o u l d no t be s a i d t h a t t h e r e was a 
Mhiqh dt-;qvr-M:i nl ) MM* »k lb i I it y" I li.ii! iJiinl In r ' " inuim t wuiild M .-.ill I 
i n substantial harm. 
rriERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF HIGHLY UNREASONABLE 
"ONDUCT OR AN EXTREME DEPARTURE OF CARE 
Plaintiffs cou^: ::Ot establish i hiG element for two reasons. 
FLI'GI, acts or ot. ..jions wh ,...,, , .,,* *>e considered "fault" rose 
only to the itvei of negl iaen— • ' •  } Se cond 
precautions take:- ::,o prevent or vi tiate serious injury show there 
was i 1 :: 1 :i :i gl :i 1 y in n: easoi iab] e coi lduct or an extreme departure of • 
care. 
^ NEGLIGENCE OR INADVERTENCE. 
^ • " . r 1 
motives to Gunther"! Yet . '.a.-~h discrete ac* or emission cculd 
* , . .-•; 3 as other t-b^ j
 :^vJ /e^tence or 
negligence, and combining them did not change their character. 
(2) PRECAUTIONS TAKEN". 
T h e - 1 i • i ' i 111 ' i i i i ' I I in i  I in i Il ' ' i u p p o i I I ' I i 1 i n * 11 I i "I I I 
Although, reasonable minds could have differed on whether 
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Gunther's should have done something differently, reasonable 
minds could not differ that the conduct of Gunther's did not rise 
to the level of "highly unreasonable conduct or an extreme 
departure of care," particularly in light of the myriad factors 
that combined to cause the spillage, as discussed above. 
Gunther's took precautions to see that sufficient combustion 
air existed, and but for the combination of other factors, the 
accident would not have occurred. 
C NO EVIDENCE OF A HIGH DEGREE OF DANGER 
PRESENT. 
Because of the adequacy of the ventilation system for the 
prior application (oil furnace), testing procedures, the multiple 
safety redundancy built into the Lennox furnace, and the 
reasonable expectation that other non-parties would do their work 
properly (duct work, vent blockage), this was not a situation 
where a high degree of danger was present. Indeed, the fact of 
this accident was highly unusual and occurred only because of a 
combination of factors attributable to defendants and others. 
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The decision . re i.>"t -JYV ~±ci j e a f f i rmed and 
p i a i u L i i i o ' appear . . -ij.^ in ^uSiuxssed ~ l^"1 r e s p e c t s , 
DATED t h i <; ^i / d a y i if J u l y , I  ' i 'H 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN £ , MARTINEAU 
Shawn E. 
"ichard A. "an Wago: 
Attorneys for Defendant/KppelJ ee 
N:\4613\813\BRIEF.2 
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XI. ADDENDUM 
Rule 51, Utah Rule " Civil Procedure. 
Rule 51 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
for judgment in accordance with his. motion for a directed 
verdict. A motion for a new trial may be joined with this 
motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the alternative. If 
a verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment to 
stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial 
or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had 
been directed. If no verdict was returned the court may direct 
the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been 
directed or may order a new trial. 
Cc) Same: Conditional rulings on grant of motion. 
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, provided for in Subdivision (b) of this rule, is 
granted, the court shall also rule on the motion for a new 
trial, if any, by determining whether it should be granted 
if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and 
shall specify the grounds for granting or denying the 
motion for a new trial. If the motion for a new trial is thus 
conditionally granted, the order thereon does not affect 
the finality of the judgment. In case the motion for a new 
trial has been conditionally granted and the judgment is 
reversed on appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the 
appellate court has otherwise ordered. In case the motion 
for a new trial has been conditionally denied, the respon-
dent on appeal may assert error in that denial; and if the 
judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings 
shall be in accordance with the order of the appellate 
court. 
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may 
serve a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 not 
later than ten days after entry of the judgment notwith-
standing the verdict. 
(d) Same: Denial of motion. If the motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict is denied, the party who prevailed 
on that motion may, as respondent, assert grounds entitling 
him to a new trial in the event the appellate court concludes 
that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. If the appellate court reverses 
the judgment, nothing in this rule precludes it from determin-
ing that the respondent is entitled to a new trial, or from 
directing the trial court to determine whether a new trial shall 
be granted. 
Rule 51. Instructions to jury; objections. 
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the 
court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests 
that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in said 
requests. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action 
upon the requests prior to instructing the jury; and it shall 
furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless 
the parties stipulate that such instructions may be given 
orally or otherwise waive this requirement. If the instructions 
are to be given in writing, all objections thereto must be made 
before the instructions are given to the jury; otherwise, 
objections may be made to the instructions after they are 
given to the jury, but before the jury retires to consider its 
verdict. No party may assign as error the giving or the failure 
to give an instruction unless he objects thereto. In objecting to 
the giving of an instruction, a party must state distinctly the 
matter to which he objects and the grounds for his objection. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement, the appellate 
court, in its discretion and in the interests of justice, may 
review the giving of or failure to give an instruction. Oppor-
tunity shall be given to make objections, and they shall be 
made out of the hearing of the jury. 
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made after the 
court has instructed the jury. The court shall not comment on 
the evidence in the case, and if the court states any of the 
evidence, it must instruct the jurors that they are the exclu-
sive judges of all questions of fact. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Rule 52. Findings by the coux it: 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jo** 
or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facta special 
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon/aS 
judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in g r a n S 
or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall « ^ l S ? 
set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of la w w h 2 
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for fiadia&jS 
not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, waethai 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set***M 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given totS 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the1 
witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that tat* 
court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of tat* 
court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and concluaiaat1 
of law are stated orally and recorded in open court followW 
the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memoran-
dum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not1 
enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings arf 
motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The court shalL 
however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for it? 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) a 
(b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than oat' 
ground. ^ 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later 
than 10 days after entry of judgment the court may amend hV 
findings or make additional findings and may amend til 
judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motk 
for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact art 
made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question1 
of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may' 
thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising tat" 
question has made in the district court an objection to sx 
findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a mob-* 
for judgment, or a motion for a new trial. it-
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law^ 
Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact and conclusion* 
of law may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact:
 Lr£ 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; ^ 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; M 
(3) "by oral consent in open court, entered in the xmxK 
utes. .mjfi 
(Amended effective Jan.. 1, 1987 ) rt 
Rule 53. Masters. <j 
(a) Appointment and compensation. Any or all of the. 
issues in an action may be referred by the court to a master, 
upon the written consent of the parties, or the court mix 
appoint a master in an action, in accordance with the provi-j 
sions of Subdivision (b) of this rule. As used in these rules the, 
word "master" includes a referee, an auditor, and an examine^ 
The compensation to be allowed to a master shall be fixed hy. 
the court, and shall be charged upon such of the parties or paioV 
out of any fund or subject matter of the action, which is in the 
custody and control of the court as the court may 
direct Tbt^  
master shall not retain his report as security for his compen-
sation; but when the party ordered to pay the compensatim 
allowed by the court does not pay it after notice and within tar 
time prescribed by the court, the master is entitled to a writ» 
execution against the delinquent party. *J 
(b) Reference. A reference to a master shall be the exo 
tion and not the rule. In actions to be tried by a jury,jfi 
reference shall be made only when the issues are compUcatedJ; 
in actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of account^ 
a reference shall, in the absence of the written consent of th* 
parties, be made only upon a showing that some exception** 
condition requires i t 
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